Values within Reason.

Area of Science:

• Social Sciences
• Philosophy of Science
• Ethics

Background:

• Traditional social science often assumes a strict dichotomy between facts and values.
• Objectivity is frequently conflated with value-neutrality, leading to the exclusion of normative considerations.
• Values are often misconstrued as purely subjective and irrational.

Purpose of the Study:

• To question the assumed radical difference between facts and values.
• To challenge the notion that objectivity and values are incompatible.
• To re-evaluate the role of values and normativity in social science.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of key concepts: objectivity, values, normativity, and thick ethical concepts.
• Deconstruction of assumptions regarding the fact-value distinction.
• Examination of the relationship between descriptive and evaluative judgments.

Main Results:

• Assumptions about fact-value separation stem from semantic ambiguities in 'objectivity' and a misunderstanding of values.
• Objective social science description necessitates evaluative judgments, particularly 'thick ethical concepts' where description and evaluation merge.
• The 'is-ought' framework inadequately captures the pervasive role of normativity in social science and daily life.

Conclusions:

• Facts and values are not always separate; evaluative judgments are integral to objective social science.
• A revised understanding of objectivity and values is needed for robust social scientific inquiry.
• Normativity is a fundamental aspect of social science and human life, not to be excluded.