Towards a Unitary Approach to Human Action Control.

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• The traditional dual-route model separates human action into intentional and automatic categories.
• This distinction relies on criteria like intention-independence and reward sensitivity.
• Previous attempts to clearly differentiate these action types have faced significant challenges.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate the dual-route model of human action control.
• To demonstrate the empirical and conceptual limitations in distinguishing intentional from automatic actions.
• To propose an alternative, unitary framework for action control.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of existing theories on action control.
• Critique of criteria used to differentiate intentional and automatic actions (e.g., reward sensitivity, rationality).
• Theoretical proposal of a unitary action control model.

Main Results:

• No empirical evidence supports the existence of intention-independent actions.
• Criteria like reward sensitivity and rationality are conceptually flawed for distinguishing action types.
• The dual-route model's distinctions are systematically unsubstantiated.

Conclusions:

• The dual-route model of action control is empirically and conceptually problematic.
• A unitary approach, representing actions by perceptual effect codes, is a more parsimonious and feasible alternative.
• This unitary model emphasizes intention-sensitive selection and metacontrol states in action regulation.