Transparency and cooperation in repeated dilemma games: a meta study

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Game Theory
• Experimental Economics

Background:

• Cooperation is crucial in social dilemmas and market interactions.
• Information availability significantly influences strategic decision-making.
• Previous research has explored factors affecting cooperation, but the nuanced impact of different information types remains an active area of investigation.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate how different types of transparency affect cooperation in experimental games.
• To analyze the impact of earnings versus choices transparency on voluntary contributions and oligopoly collusion.

Main Methods:

• Meta-analysis of experimental data from finitely repeated dilemma games with fixed matching.
• Inclusion of data from 71 studies on the voluntary contributions paradigm (122 data points).
• Inclusion of data from 18 studies on decision-making in oligopoly (50 data points).

Main Results:

• Transparency about group earnings significantly reduces contributions to public goods and collusion in oligopoly markets.
• Transparency about individual choices generally increases contributions and collusion, though effect sizes vary.
• Consistent effects of information type were observed across both voluntary contributions and oligopoly settings.

Conclusions:

• The type of information disclosed critically influences cooperative behavior and market collusion.
• Policies aimed at modulating cooperation should carefully consider whether to promote transparency of earnings or choices.
• Findings offer practical guidance for policymakers seeking to stimulate or limit cooperative outcomes in various contexts.