The Price Equation, Gradient Dynamics, and Continuous Trait Game Theory

A recent article convincingly nominated the Price equation as the fundamental theorem of evolution and used it as a foundation to derive several other theorems. A major section of evolutionary theory that was not addressed is that of game theory and gradient dynamics of continuous traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Deriving fundamental results in these fields under the unifying framework of the Price equation illuminates similarities and differences between approaches and allows a simple, unified view of game-theoretical and dynamic concepts. Using Taylor polynomials and the Price equation, I derive a dynamic measure of evolutionary change, a condition for singular points, the convergence stability criterion, and an alternative interpretation of evolutionary stability. Furthermore, by applying the Price equation to a multivariable Taylor polynomial, the direct fitness approach to kin selection emerges. Finally, I compare these results to the mean gradient equation of quantitative genetics and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics.