Co-action equilibrium fails to predict choices in mixed-strategy settings

Area of Science:

• Behavioral Economics
• Game Theory
• Social Psychology

Background:

• Social projection, the tendency to attribute one's own characteristics to others, is a proposed mechanism for cooperation in social dilemmas.
• The social projection hypothesis has been formalized in game theory as co-action equilibrium (for symmetric games) and consistent evidential equilibrium (for general games).
• These theoretical frameworks aim to predict behavioral choices in experimental games.

Purpose of the Study:

• To empirically test the predictions of the co-action equilibrium concept derived from the social projection hypothesis.
• To investigate whether individuals exhibit social projection in a controlled experimental setting.

Main Methods:

• An experiment using a simple binary minimizer game was conducted.
• Participants' choices were analyzed to assess adherence to the co-action equilibrium predictions.
• Behavioral data was collected to identify patterns of social projection.

Main Results:

• The experimental results provided no evidence supporting the predictions of the co-action equilibrium concept.
• Observed behavior in the minimizer game did not align with the theoretical expectations of social projection.
• The study failed to find empirical support for social projection in this specific game context.

Conclusions:

• The findings challenge the applicability of the co-action equilibrium model as a predictor of behavior in the tested experimental game.
• This study suggests that social projection may not be a significant factor driving choices in simple binary minimizer games.
• Further research is needed to explore the conditions under which social projection might influence decision-making in social dilemmas.