Security Investment in Contagious Networks

Area of Science:

• Computer Science
• Network Security
• Game Theory

Background:

• System security is interdependent, with risks propagating through vulnerable network links.
• Investments in interconnecting link security can mitigate overall system risks.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a game-theoretic model for optimizing security investments in interconnected network nodes.
• To analyze the direct and indirect influences of security investments on network-wide risks.

Main Methods:

• Developed a game model where each node calculates optimal security investment based on assets, vulnerabilities, threats, and budget.
• Considered nonlinear influences of one node's investment on others' risks.
• Proved the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game.

Main Results:

• The model determines optimal security investment levels for individual nodes within a network.
• Analysis shows that perfectly rational players, using the proposed utility function, make more cost-effective security investment decisions.
• Demonstrated that considering other players' investment effects leads to better outcomes.

Conclusions:

• The game-theoretic approach provides a framework for effective security investment in interdependent systems.
• Rational decision-making, considering network effects, is crucial for maximizing the cost-effectiveness of security measures.
• The model is applicable to various information systems and network security scenarios.