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Conditioning on What? Heterogeneous Contributions and Conditional Cooperation
Björn Hartig1, Bernd Irlenbusch2, Felix Kölle3
1Royal Holloway, University of London, Department of Economics, Egham Hill, Egham Surrey TW20 0EX, UK.
Abstract:
We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects people's willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is particularly strong when others' individual contributions are relatively homogeneous. When both types of information are provided, this effect is moderated. In the case of individual feedback we find the willingness to contribute to be higher the lower the variation in others' contributions, but with pronounced heterogeneity in individuals' reactions. While the majority of people are mainly guided by others' average contributions, more people follow the bad example of a low contributor than the good example of a high contributor. Overall, we provide evidence that information (and lack thereof) about others' individual contributions affects people's willingness to cooperate in systematic ways.
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