Explaining the felt location of bodily sensations through body representations

Why are bodily sensations felt on specific body parts? This paper discusses the view according to which we need body representations to account for the felt location of bodily sensations. My aim will be to consider whether or not some claims linked with that view are substantiated (namely, that all of our grasp of the spatiality of our bodies must come from bodily sensations, that the representation of the body can determine bodily sensations surmounting sensory input, that the content of body representations cannot be action-oriented). To do this, I first introduce and assess Brian O'Shaughnessy's seminal version of the representationalist approach to bodily sensations. Next, I will inquire into a purported objection to any version of the approach, showing its inadequacy. Finally, I will concentrate on Frédérique de Vignemont's variant of the representationalist view, trying to pin down a few of her assertions. My conclusion will be that the scope and strength of the representationalist position in regard to the aforementioned claims is different from what it is usually thought to be.