Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Neuroscience
• Epistemology

Background:

• The knowledge argument posits that qualia, or subjective experiences, cannot be fully captured by physical facts.
• This argument challenges physicalist theories of mind, suggesting a gap in physicalism's explanatory power.
• Traditional formulations focus on internalist views of mental states and knowledge.

Purpose of the Study:

• To evaluate the validity of the knowledge argument against externalist theories of mind.
• To demonstrate how externalist accounts of mental states differ from internalist ones.
• To reassess the implications of the knowledge argument in light of contemporary neuroscience.

Main Methods:

• Analyzing the structure and assumptions of the knowledge argument.
• Contrasting internalist and externalist formulations of mental experience.
• Integrating findings from neuroscience regarding the nature of experience and knowledge.
• Re-evaluating the knowledge argument's premises within an externalist framework.

Main Results:

• The knowledge argument, as traditionally formulated, relies on internalist assumptions about mental content and knowledge.
• Externalist theories of mind propose that mental states depend on factors beyond the organism's internal physical constitution.
• Neuroscience supports an externalist view, indicating that experience involves interactions with the external environment.
• The enclosure of Mary in the thought experiment denies her access to external properties, thus limiting her physical knowledge by design.

Conclusions:

• The knowledge argument does not succeed against externalist theories of mind.
• Externalist theories of experience, supported by neuroscience, present a different model than that targeted by the knowledge argument.
• The argument's failure against externalism suggests physicalism remains a viable theory of mind when formulated externally.