Facts and Possibilities: A Model-Based Theory of Sentential Reasoning.

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Psychology
• Artificial Intelligence
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• Current theories of reasoning often rely on formal logic or probability, which may not fully capture everyday human inference.
• Understanding how humans interpret compound assertions (e.g., conditionals, disjunctions) and their defeasible nature is crucial for cognitive science.

Purpose of the Study:

• To present a novel theory of mental models that explains reasoning about facts, possibilities, and probabilities.
• To propose that the meaning of compound assertions refers to epistemic possibilities modulated by context and general knowledge.
• To introduce a dual-process framework distinguishing intuitive (System 1) and deliberative (System 2) reasoning.

Main Methods:

• Theoretical development of the mental model theory.
• Description of a computer implementation simulating the dual-process reasoning model.
• Empirical validation through simulation of corroborated predictions.

Main Results:

• The theory posits that compound assertions represent conjunctions of epistemic possibilities, subject to default assumptions.
• Reasoning is characterized as defeasible, meaning new information can override initial inferences.
• The computer model successfully simulates key predictions of the theory, aligning with empirical evidence.

Conclusions:

• The mental model theory offers a unified explanation for reasoning with facts, possibilities, and probabilities, accommodating defeasibility.
• The dual-process approach provides a framework for understanding the interplay between intuitive and deliberative reasoning.
• This theory contrasts with logic-based and probability-based approaches, offering a new perspective on cognitive inference.