Inoculating science against potential pandemics and information hazards

Area of Science:

• Biosecurity
• Synthetic Biology
• Information Hazards

Background:

• The de novo assembly of horsepox virus demonstrated an information hazard, where published methods for poxvirus synthesis led to widespread dissemination of potentially harmful information.
• Current DNA synthesis screening systems are insufficient, failing to cover most companies and reliably prevent the creation of dangerous pathogens.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose an upgraded system for screening synthesized DNA for hazardous sequences.
• To advocate for a shift towards proactive security and safety discussions in scientific research.
• To suggest implementing early-stage peer review for high-risk research areas.

Main Methods:

• Proposing an upgraded screening system using one-way encryption and a global network of servers for confidential scrutiny of DNA production.
• Suggesting financial incentives, boycotts, and hardware-level locks to ensure compliance with new security measures.
• Recommending a change in scientific norms to favor preregistration and advisory peer review for planned experiments.

Main Results:

• The horsepox incident underscores the inadequacy of existing biosecurity measures for synthetic DNA.
• An international, encrypted server network could enhance the confidential screening of commercial DNA synthesis.
• Early-stage peer review for fields like synthetic virology and gene drive research could mitigate risks.

Conclusions:

• Existing DNA synthesis screening requires significant upgrades to address information hazards and prevent the creation of dangerous pathogens.
• A multi-faceted approach involving technological solutions, financial incentives, and policy changes is needed to improve biosecurity.
• Adopting proactive measures like early-stage peer review is crucial for managing risks associated with rapidly advancing biotechnologies.