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Related Experiment Video

Updated: Feb 2, 2026

Author Spotlight: Streamlining Visual Dynamics to Simplify Molecular Dynamics Simulations Using Gromacs
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Author Spotlight: Streamlining Visual Dynamics to Simplify Molecular Dynamics Simulations Using Gromacs

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Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation.

Roberto Galbiati1,2, Emeric Henry3,2, Nicolas Jacquemet4

  • 1Department of Economics, Sciences Po, CNRS, 75007 Paris, France; roberto.galbiati@sciencespo.fr.

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
|November 21, 2018
PubMed
Summary

Past fines, even when removed, can sustain cooperation by influencing individual behavior and fostering reciprocal kindness. This suggests a lasting impact of enforcement policies on social cooperation.

Keywords:
cooperationexperimentindirect reciprocityinstitutional spilloverprisoner’s dilemma

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Area of Science:

  • Behavioral Economics
  • Experimental Economics
  • Game Theory

Background:

  • Social dilemmas arise when private incentives conflict with social payoffs.
  • Enforcement mechanisms, such as fines, are often employed to sustain cooperation in such situations.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To investigate the long-term effects of past fines on current cooperative behavior.
  • To identify the mechanisms through which past enforcement influences cooperation.

Main Methods:

  • Laboratory experiment designed to simulate social dilemmas and the imposition/removal of fines.
  • Behavioral analysis of participants' cooperative actions and interactions.

Main Results:

  • Past fines directly increase future propensity to cooperate.
  • Prior fines lead to increased partner cooperation and subsequent reciprocal "niceness" even after fines are removed.
  • The indirect reciprocity mechanism is empirically dominant, creating a snowball effect.

Conclusions:

  • Enforcement policies, specifically fines, can have persistent effects on cooperation beyond their active enforcement period.
  • The indirect reciprocity channel is a key driver of sustained cooperation following past enforcement.
  • Findings inform the design of more effective and potentially less costly enforcement strategies.