Locating the Source(s) of the Social Value Requirement(s)

In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Danielle Wenner looks at a few prominent analyses of the social value requirement for clinical research, claiming that they are all based on what she calls a transactional model of research ethics. She argues that the transactional model fails to provide a secure foundation for the social value requirement, and then, appealing to John Rawls, she argues that a more secure foundation lies in the principles of social justice. Wenner's attempt to locate the source of the social value requirement raises important questions regarding its scope and strength. To determine what the social value requirement requires, we need to know why it's a requirement. Does the social value requirement apply to all trials or only to a subset? Is it a necessary condition on ethical research or an important consideration that can conflict with, and sometimes be defeated by, other considerations? Wenner's attempt to answer these questions is obscured by the fact that she mistakenly regards a minority view of research ethics as the mainstream view. Once we correct for that, her analysis of the foundation of the social value requirement provides a valuable opportunity to consider how the ethics of research as an institution might supplement or alter the ethics of individual clinical trials.