A Study on a Sequential One-Defender-N-Attacker Game.

Area of Science:

• Game Theory
• Public Policy
• Security Studies

Background:

• Existing research often models government threats as a single, monolithic attacker.
• This simplification overlooks the diverse interests and preferences of multiple, independent attackers.
• Such a modeling approach can result in suboptimal defense investment strategies for governments.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop a game theory model that accurately represents a single defender facing multiple, unmergeable attackers.
• To analyze the impact of attacker independence on optimal defense strategies.
• To provide insights for government decision-making in complex threat environments.

Main Methods:

• Development of a sequential game with complete information.
• Numerical experiments utilizing ratio and exponential contest success functions.
• Comparison of multi-attacker scenarios with a single-attacker model.

Main Results:

• Modeling multiple attackers as independent agents is crucial for optimal defense allocation.
• Divergent attacker interests significantly influence defense investment outcomes.
• The study quantifies the inefficiencies arising from mishandling multi-attacker situations.

Conclusions:

• Governments must account for the independent nature of multiple attackers for effective security.
• The developed model offers a more realistic framework for understanding and responding to diverse threats.
• Findings provide actionable insights for enhancing national defense strategies and resource allocation.