Paradigms, possibilities, and probabilities: Comment on Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016)

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Science
• Psychology
• Logic

Background:

• A 2016 study by Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird compared probabilistic reasoning with a revised mental models theory (MMT).
• The study focused on inferences involving the modal term "possibly."
• The original study concluded their findings supported the revised MMT.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critique the characterization of probabilistic validity (p-validity) used in the 2016 study.
• To argue against the necessity and logical consistency of the revised MMT.
• To propose an alternative pragmatic account for understanding modal inferences.

Main Methods:

• Critical analysis of the theoretical framework of probabilistic validity.
• Examination of the logical implications of the revised mental models theory.
• Proposal of an alternative pragmatic explanation for modal reasoning.

Main Results:

• The characterization of p-validity in the 2016 study is inadequate and its application to the inferences is unclear.
• The revised MMT is not well-motivated, leads to logical absurdities, and lacks a consistent computational-level theory.
• The experimental data may stem from non-colloquial language use.

Conclusions:

• The comparison between probabilistic reasoning and MMT in the 2016 study is inappropriate due to differing levels of explanation.
• An alternative pragmatic account, where possibility is defined by the inability to rule out a conclusion, could explain the findings.
• This pragmatic account can be applied to the unrevised MMT, making the revision unnecessary.