Grounding responsibility in something (more) solid

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind

Background:

• Confabulation, the creation of false memories, is often compared to perceptual illusions.
• Existing philosophical accounts of confabulation, like Doris's, struggle to assess responsibility due to a lack of neuroscientific grounding.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the implications of confabulation for understanding cognitive systems.
• To evaluate the adequacy of current philosophical frameworks in assessing responsibility in cases of confabulation.
• To highlight the necessity of integrating neuroscientific data into these assessments.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of confabulation and perceptual illusions.
• Critique of Doris's account of confabulation and responsibility.
• Argument for the inclusion of neuroscientific insights.

Main Results:

• Confabulation cases, while illustrative of cognitive system gaps, do not disprove the general accuracy of everyday perception or cognition.
• Doris's account is insufficient for making real-time (synchronic) responsibility assessments.
• Understanding brain activity in agents is crucial for accurate responsibility assessments.

Conclusions:

• Everyday perception and cognition are largely reliable, despite phenomena like confabulation.
• Neuroscience is essential for a robust understanding of agency and responsibility.
• Philosophical accounts of cognitive phenomena must incorporate empirical data from the brain.