The unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness

Area of Science:

• Neuroscience
• Cognitive Science
• Philosophy of Mind
• Theoretical Computer Science

Background:

• Consciousness is a central question in neuroscience, with numerous proposed theories.
• Existing theories often link consciousness to specific brain functions or causal structures.
• Information Integration Theory (IIT) and Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT) are prominent causal structure theories.

Purpose of the Study:

• To rigorously evaluate the scientific validity of causal structure theories of consciousness.
• To determine if theories like IIT and RPT are falsifiable or empirically testable.
• To apply principles from the theory of computation to the problem of consciousness.

Main Methods:

• Utilized theorems from the theory of computation.
• Analyzed the logical and computational underpinnings of causal structure theories.
• Assessed the scientific testability and falsifiability of IIT and RPT.

Main Results:

• Demonstrated that causal structure theories of consciousness are either false.
• Showed that these theories fall outside the scope of scientific inquiry.
• Highlighted limitations in defining consciousness based solely on causal structures.

Conclusions:

• Causal structure theories, including IIT and RPT, face significant theoretical challenges.
• The scientific explanation of consciousness may require different theoretical frameworks.
• Further research should focus on empirically testable models of consciousness.