An Analysis on Optimal Attack Schedule Based on Channel Hopping Scheme in Cyber-Physical Systems

Area of Science:

• Cyber-Physical Systems Security
• Wireless Communication Security
• Networked Control Systems

Background:

• Remote state estimation in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) is vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
• Wireless sensors transmitting data to remote estimators face security challenges due to channel hopping and potential jamming.

Purpose of the Study:

• Investigate security vulnerabilities in CPS remote state estimation under periodic DoS attacks.
• Analyze the optimal strategy for an energy-constrained jammer to maximize CPS performance degradation.
• Develop algorithms for approximating optimal attack schedules.

Main Methods:

• Modeling DoS attacks on wireless sensors using channel hopping schemes.
• Formulating the jammer's channel selection problem as an integer programming problem.
• Developing approximation algorithms for optimal attack strategies.

Main Results:

• Theoretical proof that an unequal number of attacked channels per time step is more detrimental to CPS performance than an equal number.
• Demonstrated effectiveness of approximation algorithms in finding optimal attack schedules.
• Numerical validation of theoretical findings and algorithm performance.

Conclusions:

• An energy-constrained jammer can strategically select an unequal number of channels to attack for greater impact on CPS security.
• The proposed integer programming formulation and approximation algorithms provide effective solutions for optimizing jammer strategies.
• Findings contribute to understanding and mitigating DoS attack impacts in wireless CPS environments.