The multi-user evolutionary game simulation in water quality-based water source system

Water is a crucial factor for human living and maintaining ecological system health. Water resource conflict has become an important factor which restricts regional economic development and affects the harmony and stability of society. This paper, on the one hand, builds a trilateral evolution game model of water intaking in the upper, middle, and lower reaches in terms of water-quality conflict, and makes an analysis of the evolutionary stable strategy of the model on the foundation of a cross-border water resource conflict warning system and based on the view of evolution game. The paper verifies related conclusions by using numerical simulation calculation examples and makes sensitivity analysis of the change of the parameters of the model. The result of the research indicates that (1) there are three groups of system local gradual stable points [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] in the trilateral game of water quality-based cross-border conflicts. This means that there are three groups of evolutionary stable strategies: (non-cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation), (cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation), and (non-cooperation, cooperation, cooperation). The conclusion obtained via verification by using numerical simulation is that upper and middle reaches are the sections which most likely lead to conflicts, so the strategy selected therefor is (non-cooperation, non-cooperation, cooperation); (2) in water quality-based cross-border conflict, the factor [Formula: see text] of compensation cost increased because excessive transfer of pollutants has a significant effect on water-intaking group strategy evolution path. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to the scientific operation of cross-border water quality and water amount conflicts and the realization of the goal of water resources management.