Genome Modifying Reproductive Procedures and their Effects on Numerical Identity

The advantages and risks of a number of new genome modifying procedures seeking to create healthy or enhanced individuals, such as Maternal Spindle Transfer, Pronuclear Transfer, Cytoplasmic Transfer and Genome Editing, are currently being assessed from an ethical perspective, by national and international policy organizations. One important aspect being examined concerns the effects of these procedures on different kinds of identity. In other words, whether or not a procedure only modifies the qualities or properties of an existing human being, meaning that merely the qualitative identity of this single individual is affected, or whether a procedure results in the creation of a new individual, meaning that a numerically distinct human being would have come into existence. In this article, the different identity arguments proposed, so far, are presented with respect to these novel reproductive procedures. An alternative view is then developed using the Origin Essentialism argument to indicate that any change in the creative conditions of an individual such as in his or her biology but also the moment in time, and the three dimensions of space, will have a numerical identity effect and bring into existence a new individual who would not, otherwise, have existed. Because of this, it is concluded that a form of selection may have taken place in which a preference was expressed for one new possible individual instead of another, based on some frame of reference. This may then mean that a selection between persons has occured  contravening the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights which was ratified in 2000.