Kantian indifference about moral reason.

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Kantian Ethics
• Epistemology

Background:

• Philosophical arguments challenging moral reason often assume a connection between moral optimism and empirical optimism.
• This assumption, termed "optimistic rationalism" by May, underpins pessimistic views on moral reason.
• Contemporary Kantian ethics offers a critical perspective on this linkage.

Purpose of the Study:

• To analyze the philosophical assumption underlying pessimistic arguments about moral reason.
• To examine the concept of "optimistic rationalism" as presented by May.
• To situate May's work within existing literature by exploring counterarguments from Kantian philosophy.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of arguments concerning moral reason and optimism.
• Explication of May's "optimistic rationalism" concept.
• Comparative analysis of May's claims with Christine Korsgaard's Kantian ethical framework.

Main Results:

• Pessimistic arguments regarding moral reason are shown to depend on a contested philosophical assumption.
• The assumption that philosophical optimists about moral reason must also be empirical optimists is critically evaluated.
• Christine Korsgaard's Kantian perspective is presented as a resistance to this assumption.

Conclusions:

• The link between moral and empirical optimism, central to pessimistic arguments, is philosophically questionable.
• Kantian ethics, particularly through figures like Korsgaard, provides a framework for resisting the "optimistic rationalism" assumption.
• Re-evaluating this assumption opens new avenues for understanding the nature and scope of moral reason.