Are the better cooperators dormant or quiescent?

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary biology
• Game theory
• Population dynamics

Background:

• The origin and maintenance of cooperation remain significant evolutionary puzzles.
• Ecological life-history traits, often overlooked, can influence selection efficiency and cooperation.
• Species with resting stages (quiescent states or seed banks) offer a unique model for studying cooperation.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the role of ecological life-history traits, specifically resting stage duration, in the evolution and maintenance of cooperation.
• To model cooperation dynamics in populations with varying quiescence or dormancy times for cooperators and defectors.
• To determine conditions under which cooperation can evolve and be stably maintained in heterogeneous populations.

Main Methods:

• Utilized game theory, specifically the prisoner's dilemma, to model cooperation and defection payoffs.
• Employed singular perturbation theory to simplify a complex model into a one-dimensional replicator-like equation.
• Applied adaptive dynamics to identify evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) for cooperation.

Main Results:

• Cooperation cannot persist in a homogeneous population if resting stage time scales are identical for cooperators and defectors.
• Distinct differences in time scales of resting stages can lead to the stable maintenance of cooperation.
• In seed bank models, cooperators must activate faster than defectors; in quiescent models, cooperators must be slower.

Conclusions:

• Ecological traits, such as differential timing of resting stages, are crucial for understanding the evolution of cooperation.
• These findings have broad implications for maintaining cooperation in diverse microbial, invertebrate, and plant populations.
• The study highlights the importance of incorporating life-history traits into evolutionary models of cooperation.