Artificial wombs, birth and 'birth': a response to Romanis

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Reproductive Technology
• Moral Philosophy

Background:

• The moral status of human subjects developing in artificial wombs (AWs) is a subject of ongoing debate.
• Previous arguments posited that AW subjects share the moral status of newborns, deserving similar protections.
• Counterarguments suggest AW subjects are unique entities, distinct from fetuses or newborns.

Purpose of the Study:

• To address criticisms regarding the moral status of artificial womb subjects.
• To reaffirm the thesis that AW subjects, regardless of birth status, share the moral status of newborns.
• To clarify the definitions of birth and ectogenesis in the context of artificial womb development.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and ethical analysis.
• Direct response to specific counterarguments concerning birth, embryo status, and ectogenesis distinctions.
• Reaffirmation of the moral equivalence between artificial womb subjects and newborns.

Main Results:

• Rebuttal of the claim that partial ectogenesis subjects are not newborns.
• Clarification that the argument does not imply non-implanted embryos are 'born'.
• Affirmation that all subjects of ectogenesis, born or unborn, share the moral status of newborns.

Conclusions:

• Subjects in artificial wombs, including those from partial or complete ectogenesis, possess the same moral status as newborns.
• The definition and implications of 'birth' in the context of ectogenesis require careful consideration.
• Ethical debates surrounding artificial wombs should center on the moral status and rights of the developing subject.