Affordability and Non-Perfectionism in Moral Action

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Public Policy Analysis
• Health Economics

Background:

• Policy-makers often cite 'unaffordability' as a reason to deny public funding for services or interventions.
• This justification implies that exceeding a budget limit is a sufficient reason for non-funding.
• The philosophical implications of using affordability as a sole criterion for public financing remain underexplored.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically examine the ethical and logical basis of using affordability as a primary criterion in public financing decisions.
• To analyze whether 'unaffordability' constitutes a valid moral reason to withhold funding for essential services.
• To explore the potential for 'numerical discrimination' and fairness issues arising from affordability-based funding allocation.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of moral mathematics and decision-making principles.
• Application of the principle of 'non-perfectionism' to public finance.
• Examination of fairness, equity, and lottery principles in resource allocation.

Main Results:

• The use of affordability criteria in public financing can represent a 'mistake in moral mathematics'.
• It violates the 'non-perfectionism' principle: the inability to fund all good deeds does not negate the reason to fund some.
• Affordability criteria, when used to choose between services, can lead to 'numerical discrimination' and fairness concerns.

Conclusions:

• Affordability, while a practical constraint, should not be the sole or primary ethical justification for denying public services.
• Public finance decisions require a more nuanced ethical framework that considers the 'good' that can be achieved, not just budget limits.
• Alternative approaches are needed to ensure fairness and avoid discrimination when allocating limited public resources.