The Quality of Life is Not Strained: Disability, Human Nature, Well-Being, and Relationships

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Philosophy of Medicine
• Disability Studies

Background:

• The common view of disability as a harm is often supported by perfectionist theories.
• Traditional Aristotelian perfectionism prioritizes rationalistic goods, potentially excluding disabled individuals from flourishing.
• Existing frameworks struggle to adequately account for the quality of life and well-being of disabled persons.

Purpose of the Study:

• To explore the relationship between disability and quality of life.
• To critique traditional perfectionism and propose a new, relationship-centered version.
• To provide improved bioethical and clinical guidance regarding judgments about disabled lives.

Main Methods:

• Critique of traditional Aristotelian perfectionism.
• Development of a revised perfectionist theory prioritizing social capacities and relationships.
• Application of the theory to bioethical debates and clinical practices, using Down syndrome as a case study.

Main Results:

• A new version of perfectionism, prioritizing social capacities and relationships, is defended.
• This relationship-centered perfectionism accommodates and explains disabled thriving.
• The revised theory offers a more plausible account of disability and well-being.

Conclusions:

• Relationship-centered perfectionism provides a stronger ethical framework for understanding disability and well-being.
• This approach has significant implications for bioethics and healthcare, particularly in clinical decision-making.
• The theory offers practical guidance for assessing the quality of disabled lives.