Institutional Performance and Vote Buying in India.

Area of Science:

• Political Science
• Development Economics
• Public Administration

Background:

• Inefficient and corrupt institutions incentivize citizens towards short-term, clientelist exchanges.
• This focus on immediate benefits comes at the expense of uncertain, long-term programmatic rewards from the state.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate how institutional quality influences citizen responsiveness to political inducements.
• To understand the relationship between institutional weakness, corruption, and citizen engagement with state services.

Main Methods:

• A controlled comparison using a state bifurcation within the Indian federal system.
• A survey administered across the newly formed state boundaries to assess citizen behavior.

Main Results:

• Citizens in weaker institutional settings show greater responsiveness to small political inducements.
• The effect of institutional setting on responsiveness weakens as the size of the inducement increases.
• State capacity and certainty in delivering basic goods significantly moderate citizen engagement.

Conclusions:

• Institutional deficiencies shape citizen preferences towards immediate gratification over long-term development.
• Policy interventions must consider institutional context when designing programs to foster citizen engagement and trust.