Dissipativity-Based Sliding-Mode Control of Cyber-Physical Systems Under Denial-of-Service Attacks

In this article, we investigate the problem of the dissipativity-based resilient sliding-mode control design of cyber-physical systems with the occurrence of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. First, we analyze the physical layer operating without DoS attacks to ensure the input-to-state practical stability (ISpS). The upper bound of the sample-data rate in this situation can be identified synchronously. Next, for systems under DoS attacks, we present the following results: 1) combined with reasonable hypotheses of DoS attacks, the ISpS as well as dissipativity of the underlying system can be guaranteed; 2) the upper bound of the sample-data rate in the presence of DoS attacks can be derived; and 3) the sliding-mode controller is synthesized to achieve the desired goals in a finite time. Finally, two examples are given to illustrate the applicability of our theoretical derivation.