Anti-Realist Pluralism: a New Approach to Folk Metaethics

Area of Science:

• Metaethics
• Moral Psychology
• Folk Intuitions

Background:

• The common experience of morality as objective truths provides a prima facie reason to believe in moral realism.
• Recent concerns question the empirical basis of psychological research supporting moral objectivity.
• This study addresses these concerns by advancing research on folk intuitions about moral objectivity.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a novel experimental design for measuring folk intuitions regarding moral objectivity.
• To investigate contemporary folk intuitions about moral objectivity.
• To evaluate the implications of these intuitions for the moral realism debate.

Main Methods:

• Development of a new experimental design to assess intuitions about moral objectivity.
• Conducting a survey based on the newly proposed experimental design.
• Analysis of participant responses regarding the nature of moral truths.

Main Results:

• A majority of participants denied the existence of objective moral truths across most or all moral issues.
• Many participants expressed the view that moral truth is contingent on individual and cultural beliefs (anti-realist pluralism).
• Findings indicate a potential shift away from a presumption of moral realism.

Conclusions:

• The empirical evidence challenges the realist presumptive argument derived from folk intuitions.
• Anti-realism, particularly anti-realist pluralism, may warrant a presumption in its favor.
• Further research is needed to explore the nuances of folk moral intuitions and their philosophical implications.