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Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
Haris Aziz1,2, Péter Biró3,4, Serge Gaspers1
11UNSW Sydney, Sydney, Australia.
Abstract:
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model-for each agent, there is a probability distribution over linear preferences, (2) compact indifference model-for each agent, a weak preference order is specified and each linear order compatible with the weak order is equally likely and (3) joint probability model-there is a lottery over preference profiles. For each of the models, we study the computational complexity of computing the stability probability of a given matching as well as finding a matching with the highest probability of being stable. We also examine more restricted problems such as deciding whether a certainly stable matching exists. We find a rich complexity landscape for these problems, indicating that the form uncertainty takes is significant.
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