Standards of evidence and causality in regulatory science: Risk and benefit assessment

In this paper we analyze the Russo-Williamson Thesis (RWT) as a standard of evidence in regulatory science, in risk as well as benefit assessment. In our analysis we take account of the recent controversies that have taken place in regulation with respect to the evidentiary requirements necessary for regulatory decision making. RWT's main point is that not only probabilistic but also mechanistic evidence is necessary for being able to infer the existence of causal links. We ask in which way RWT could have an impact upon current decision making about subjecting to regulation (or, to the contrary, leaving them unregulated) certain chemical substances, food stuffs, health claims, and other typical objects of regulation. We show that the application of RWT resolves some of the problems posed by current standards of evidence. RWT makes it possible to determine with higher accuracy if a particular substance should be subjected to regulation or not, even though under certain circumstances RWT itself may turn into a source of regulatory error. The adequacy of RWT as a standard of evidence depends on the precise manner of its application to regulation (particularly the consideration of mechanistic evidence as a complementary or necessary requirement), as well as the assessment of its non-epistemic consequences.