Evolutionary game inspired by Cipolla's basic laws of human stupidity

Area of Science:

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics
• Social Dynamics

Background:

• Classical evolutionary games typically model collaborators and defectors.
• Carlo Cipolla's work identifies "stupid" individuals as uniquely detrimental to collective well-being.
• Existing models often assume rational players, neglecting non-rational behaviors.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop an evolutionary game model that incorporates "stupid" players.
• To analyze the impact of "stupid" players on population wealth within a spatial game.
• To explore non-rational dynamics beyond the standard rational player paradigm.

Main Methods:

• Development of a spatial evolutionary game with four strategies: collaborators, defectors, and two new types, including a "stupid" player.
• Utilizing imitation dynamics that extend beyond rational choice theory.
• Simulation and analysis of the game's outcomes to quantify the damage caused by "stupid" players.

Main Results:

• The introduction of "stupid" players significantly reduces global wealth compared to traditional models.
• Spatial structure and imitation dynamics influence the propagation and impact of stupidity.
• "Stupid" players are shown to be a critical factor undermining population wealth.

Conclusions:

• The model validates Cipolla's concept of "stupid" individuals as a significant threat to collective prosperity.
• Non-rational behaviors, particularly stupidity, play a crucial role in social and economic dynamics.
• Further research into the evolutionary impact of non-rational strategies is warranted.