Beyond the corrective action hierarchy: A systems approach to organizational change

Many patient safety organizations recommend the use of the action hierarchy (AH) to identify strong corrective actions following an investigative analysis of patient harm events. Strong corrective actions, such as forcing functions and equipment standardization, improve patient safety by either preventing the occurrence of active failures (i.e. errors or violations) or reducing their consequences if they do occur.

We propose that the emphasis on implementing strong fixes that incrementally improve safety one event at a time is necessary, yet insufficient, for improving safety. This singular focus has detracted from the pursuit of major changes that transform systems safety by targeting the latent conditions which consistently underlie active failures. To date, however, there are no standardized models or methods that enable patient safety professionals to assess, develop and implement systems changes to improve patient safety.

We propose a multifaceted definition of 'systems change'. Based on this definition, various types and levels of systems change are described. A rubric for determining the extent to which a specific corrective action reflects a 'systems change' is provided. This rubric incorporates four fundamental dimensions of systems change: scope, breadth, depth and degree. Scores along these dimensions can then be used to classify corrective actions within our proposed systems change hierarchy (SCH).

Additional research is needed to validate the proposed rubric and SCH. However, when used in conjunction with the AH, the SCH perspective will serve to foster a more holistic and transformative approach to patient safety.