Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption

In this article, we analyze a compartmental model aimed at mimicking the role of imitation and delation of corruption in social systems. In particular, the model relies on a compartmental dynamics in which individuals can transit between three states: honesty, corruption, and ostracism. We model the transitions from honesty to corruption and from corruption to ostracism as pairwise interactions. In particular, honest agents imitate corrupt peers while corrupt individuals pass to ostracism due to the delation of honest acquaintances. Under this framework, we explore the effects of introducing social intimidation in the delation of corrupt people. To this aim, we model the probability that an honest delates a corrupt agent as a decreasing function of the number of corrupt agents, thus mimicking the fear of honest individuals to reprisals by those corrupt ones. When this mechanism is absent or weak, the phase diagram of the model shows three equilibria [(i) full honesty, (ii) full corruption, and (iii) a mixed state] that are connected via smooth transitions. However, when social intimidation is strong, the transitions connecting these states turn explosive leading to a bistable phase in which a stable full corruption phase coexists with either mixed or full honesty stable equilibria. To shed light on the generality of these transitions, we analyze the model in different network substrates by means of Monte Carlo simulations and deterministic microscopic Markov chain equations. This latter formulation allows us to derive analytically the different bifurcation points that separate the different phases of the system.