Autonomy and the limits of cognitive enhancement

Area of Science:

• Neuroethics
• Bioethics
• Philosophy of Technology

Background:

• Debates on human enhancement ethics often involve bioconservative concerns that cognitive enhancement compromises individual autonomy.
• Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu have argued that cognitive enhancement can, in fact, bolster autonomy, challenging these objections.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically examine the arguments presented by Schaefer, Kahane, and Savulescu regarding cognitive enhancement and autonomy.
• To develop a nuanced understanding of autonomy, distinguishing between its capacity, exercise, and achievement.
• To analyze the impact of cognitive enhancement on the competence and authenticity conditions necessary for autonomy.

Main Methods:

• Conceptual analysis of autonomy, differentiating between capacity, exercise, and achievement.
• Examination of the conditions for autonomy, specifically competence and authenticity.
• Evaluation of the potential effects of direct cognitive interventions on these dimensions of autonomy.

Main Results:

• Cognitive enhancement's capacity to enhance autonomy is not absolute and has inherent limitations.
• Distinguishing between the capacity for autonomy and its exercise/achievement reveals specific ways enhancement can impact autonomy.
• The effects of cognitive enhancement on competence and authenticity conditions for autonomy are complex and varied.

Conclusions:

• Direct cognitive interventions can enhance certain dimensions of autonomy, particularly the capacity for autonomy.
• However, cognitive enhancement cannot, in principle, enhance all aspects of autonomy, especially concerning authenticity and the exercise of autonomy.
• Understanding the multifaceted nature of autonomy is crucial for assessing the ethical implications and practical limits of cognitive enhancement.