Embodiment and personal identity in dementia

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Neuroscience
• Gerontology

Background:

• Traditional theories of personal identity, like those of Locke and Parfit, focus on psychological continuity (thinking, memory, rational choice).
• These theories risk excluding individuals with severe dementia from personhood.
• Existing frameworks often adopt a dualistic view, separating mind from body.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose an embodied approach to personal identity in dementia, grounded in phenomenology.
• To re-evaluate personhood by considering pre-reflective self-awareness and body memory.
• To explore the ethical implications of this embodied perspective.

Main Methods:

• Phenomenological analysis of embodiment and selfhood.
• Examination of body memory (habits, practices, preferences).
• Analysis of dementia as a loss of reflexivity versus preservation of body memory.

Main Results:

• Selfhood is constituted by pre-reflective self-awareness and embodied memory.
• Body memory, encompassing habits and preferences, persists even in advanced dementia.
• An embodied approach preserves the personhood of individuals with dementia.

Conclusions:

• Embodied selfhood offers a more inclusive understanding of personal identity in dementia.
• Preservation of body memory challenges traditional criteria for personhood.
• This perspective has significant ethical implications for dementia care and rights.