Assortative Matching with Inequality in Voluntary Contribution Games

Area of Science:

• Social Dilemmas
• Game Theory
• Behavioral Economics

Background:

• Voluntary contribution games model social dilemmas where individual self-interest leads to suboptimal group outcomes.
• Assortative matching, where similar individuals interact, can improve cooperation compared to random mixing.
• The impact of budget heterogeneity on assortative matching in public good games remains underexplored.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate the robustness of assortative matching's positive effects on cooperation when agents have heterogeneous budgets.
• To analytically and computationally assess the consequences of budget heterogeneity on public good provision efficacy.

Main Methods:

• Analytical derivation of game outcomes under assortative matching with budget heterogeneity.
• Computational simulations to quantify efficiency losses due to heterogeneity.
• Parameter analysis varying public-good provision efficacy and population inequality.

Main Results:

• Assortative matching significantly enhances cooperation and public good provision in homogeneous populations.
• Budget heterogeneity generally leads to devastating losses in efficiency, undermining cooperation.
• The severity of efficiency loss depends critically on the public-good provision efficacy and the degree of population inequality.

Conclusions:

• The benefits of assortative matching in voluntary contribution games are fragile and highly susceptible to budget heterogeneity.
• Policy or design interventions aiming to foster cooperation must account for potential inequalities in resources.
• Future research should explore mechanisms to mitigate the negative impacts of heterogeneity in social dilemma settings.