What are the drivers of induction? Towards a Material Theory

John Norton's Material Theory of Induction (Norton, 2003, 2005, 2008, forthcoming) has a two-fold, negative and positive, goal. The negative goal is to establish that formal logics of induction fail if they are understood as universally applicable schemas of induction. The positive goal is to establish that it is material facts that enable and justify inductive inferences. I argue in this paper that Norton is more successful with his negative than with his positive ambition. While I do not deny that facts constitute an important type of enabler and justifier of inductions, they are by no means the only type. This paper suggests that there are no less than six other types of background information scientists need and use to fuel and warrant inductions. The discussion of additional enablers and justifiers of inductions will further show there are practically important and intellectually challenging methodological issues Norton's theory prevents us from seeing because it leaves out this or that type of enabler and justifier.