"Death cannot harm the patient: Comparativism and the biased world problem"

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Medical Ethics
• Philosophy of Medicine

Background:

• Discussions on patients' rights and duties regarding death often precede an examination of death's impact on the individual.
• Comparativism posits that death affects the deceased, influencing end-of-life decision-making and bioethical considerations.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate the philosophical underpinnings of Comparativism in the context of end-of-life ethics.
• To determine if the concept of death injuring the patient is philosophically sound and practically applicable to medical ethics and public health policy.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical analysis of Comparativism and its reliance on possible worlds and intuitions.
• Examination of the "biased world problem" as applied to thought experiments concerning death and its value.
• Critique of using hypothetical scenarios to inform real-world medical and public health policies.

Main Results:

• Comparativism's reliance on possible worlds introduces subjective biases, mirroring issues found in evaluating intrinsic value.
• Thought experiments involving possible worlds can create an illusion of benefit or harm to the deceased.
• The methodology of Comparativism is susceptible to imposing personal biases, undermining its objective applicability.

Conclusions:

• End-of-life medical practice and policy should be grounded in empirical reality, not subjective interpretations or biases from hypothetical scenarios.
• The philosophical framework of Comparativism, while offering a different perspective on death's impact, is methodologically flawed for informing bioethical decisions.
• Prioritizing objective, reality-based assessments is essential for ethical considerations surrounding death and dying.