Vaccinating SIS epidemics under evolving perception in heterogeneous networks.

Area of Science:

• Epidemiology
• Behavioral Economics
• Mathematical Modeling

Background:

• Vaccination is crucial for epidemic control.
• Individual psychological cognition influences vaccination behavior.
• Existing models often overlook perceptual differences and their evolution.

Purpose of the Study:

• To explore how evolving perceptions impact collective vaccination behavior.
• To propose a novel evolutionary game model incorporating prospect theory.
• To assess the effectiveness of this model in epidemic control.

Main Methods:

• Developed a prospect theory-based evolutionary vaccination game model.
• Incorporated evolving reference points to represent perceptual changes.
• Compared outcomes with expected utility theory and fixed reference points.
• Introduced a mixed-reference-point mechanism combining psychological and network features.

Main Results:

• Evolving perceptions significantly reduce epidemic size compared to traditional models.
• A vaccination cost threshold exists for cognitive effects.
• The mixed-reference-point mechanism is more effective than pure reference points in reducing epidemic size, particularly at high vaccination costs.

Conclusions:

• Individual perception dynamics play a vital role in vaccination behavior and epidemic control.
• The proposed mixed-reference-point mechanism offers a promising strategy for managing network epidemics.
• Considering psychological factors can enhance public health interventions.