Fine-tuning the impairment argument

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Bioethics
• Applied Ethics

Background:

• Perry Hendricks' original impairment argument posits that if impairing an organism is immoral, greater impairment is also immoral.
• This argument faces criticism regarding the ceteris paribus condition when comparing abortion to fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS).
• The modified impairment principle (MIP) was previously proposed to address these criticisms.

Purpose of the Study:

• To address Dustin Crummett's counterexamples and moral dilemmas raised against the modified impairment principle (MIP).
• To refine the modified impairment principle (MIP) to resolve identified philosophical objections.
• To respond to Alex Gillham's critique of the 'future like ours' reasoning in the context of impairment arguments.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and conceptual analysis.
• Development of a revised modified impairment principle (MIP).
• Critical evaluation of existing objections from Crummett and Gillham.

Main Results:

• A modified impairment principle (MIP) is proposed that successfully resolves the counterexamples and moral dilemmas identified by Crummett.
• The revised MIP maintains the core logic of the impairment argument while enhancing its robustness.
• Objections to the 'future like ours' reasoning are shown to have limited impact on the overall argument.

Conclusions:

• The refined modified impairment principle (MIP) offers a stronger philosophical basis for the argument concerning the immorality of abortion.
• The study successfully defends and improves upon the impairment argument against abortion.
• Further philosophical engagement is warranted regarding the nuances of impairment and future potential in moral reasoning.