Development of a Potential Facility Risk Index for Radiological Security.

Area of Science:

• Nuclear security
• Risk assessment methodologies
• Radiological terrorism

Background:

• Radiological and nuclear terrorism pose significant threats, necessitating robust security risk assessments for radioactive sources.
• Existing risk assessment tools lack a comprehensive index for radiological facilities like healthcare centers and universities.
• Understanding and evaluating security risks associated with radioactive materials is crucial.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop and demonstrate a methodology for computing a Potential Facility Risk Index (PFRI).
• To assess the security risk of radiological facilities against radiological dispersal device (RDD) attacks.
• To provide a quantitative tool for informing decisions on radiological security improvements.

Main Methods:

• Developed a PFRI based on probable loss event (LE) and loss magnitude (LM) from RDD attacks.
• Incorporated threat assessment using a utility function for threat group attributes and RDD material preference.
• Utilized probabilistic risk assessment and pathway analysis to determine RDD material theft probabilities.
• Quantified facility vulnerability (LE) through locational hazards and security culture.
• Estimated attack consequences (LM) including loss of life and economic damage.

Main Results:

• Applied the PFRI methodology to a hypothetical healthcare facility with a single radioactive source.
• The hypothetical facility's PFRI was calculated as 2.0 on a scale of 1-10.
• This result indicates a low overall risk to the facility under the assessed RDD attack scenario.

Conclusions:

• The developed PFRI methodology offers a valuable tool for quantitative risk analysis in radiological security.
• The PFRI can aid decision-making processes for enhancing the security of radiological facilities.
• The study demonstrates the feasibility of a comprehensive risk index for facilities handling radioactive materials.