A physical unclonable neutron sensor for nuclear arms control inspections

Area of Science:

• Materials Science
• Sensor Technology
• Cryptography & Security

Background:

• Traditional sensor security depends on cryptographic algorithms and trusted hardware, which are vulnerable to manipulation and key extraction.
• Existing methods often assume sensor media are trustworthy, with security measures applied post-data acquisition (ex situ and a posteriori).
• Limitations in current sensor security hinder reliable data integrity in high-stakes environments.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose and demonstrate a novel sensor security approach independent of classical cryptography and trusted electronics.
• To develop passive sensor media capable of inherently producing secure and trustworthy data.
• To establish a method for verifying the integrity and non-malicious nature of sensor media.

Main Methods:

• Design and fabrication of non-electronic, passive sensor media.
• Incorporation of physical unclonable functions and optical complexity into sensor design.
• Characterization of media sensitivity to neutrons for high-security applications.

Main Results:

• Successful manufacturing and characterization of optically complex, physically unclonable sensor media.
• Demonstration of inherent data security and trustworthiness without reliance on traditional cryptographic methods.
• Validation of the media's potential for secure neutron detection in sensitive scenarios.

Conclusions:

• The proposed passive sensor media offer a paradigm shift in sensor security, mitigating risks associated with hardware vulnerabilities and cryptographic key management.
• This approach provides a foundation for inherently secure data acquisition, particularly valuable in applications demanding high levels of trust and verification.
• The developed technology shows significant promise for secure inspection and monitoring in critical infrastructure and defense applications.