An Overview on Denial-of-Service Attacks in Control Systems: Attack Models and Security Analyses.

Area of Science:

• Computer Science
• Control Engineering
• Cybersecurity

Background:

• Networked control systems (NCS) are increasingly vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
• These attacks disrupt communication channels, impacting system performance and stability.
• Existing research addresses various attack vectors, including jamming and packet drops.

Purpose of the Study:

• To provide a comprehensive overview of recent research on NCS security against DoS attacks.
• To analyze the effectiveness of different attack modeling and analysis techniques.
• To discuss strategies for designing resilient control and communication protocols.

Main Methods:

• Literature review of recent research efforts on NCS under DoS attacks.
• Discussion of deterministic constraint-based, game-theoretic, optimization-based, and probabilistic modeling approaches.
• Emphasis on tail-probability based failure models for jamming and packet-dropping attacks.

Main Results:

• Identified various modeling approaches for capturing DoS attack uncertainties.
• Highlighted the utility of different techniques for feedback control, state estimation, and multi-agent consensus.
• Showcased the application of attack models in security analysis of networked systems.

Conclusions:

• Attack modeling and analysis are crucial for understanding and mitigating DoS threats in NCS.
• Tail-probability based models offer a promising approach for characterizing jamming and packet-dropping attacks.
• Recent developments focus on designing attack-resilient protocols for enhanced system security.