Modelling Consciousness within Mental Monism: An Automata-Theoretic Approach

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Mind
• Computational Neuroscience
• Theoretical Physics

Background:

• Most consciousness models rely on physicalist or dualist frameworks, linking mind to brain.
• Mental monism, a framework deriving mind from mental constituents without a neural substrate, is gaining traction.
• Chalmers' Hard Problem of consciousness motivates exploring alternative frameworks like mental monism.

Purpose of the Study:

• To examine formal models of consciousness within a mental monist framework.
• To propose a minimal set of hypotheses for mental monist consciousness models.
• To investigate computational possibilities within mental monism.

Main Methods:

• Developing formal hypotheses constrained by the austere ontology of mental monism.
• Utilizing cellular automata to model universal computation within the mental world.
• Proposing a specific transition rule for temporal dynamics, featuring deep copying.

Main Results:

• Identified constraints for consciousness models within mental monism.
• Demonstrated the potential for universal computation in mental models via cellular automata.
• Introduced a novel transition rule with deep copying properties for temporal evolution.

Conclusions:

• Mental monism offers a viable, albeit constrained, framework for modeling consciousness.
• Formal models, such as those based on cellular automata, can be constructed within mental monism.
• The proposed transition rule offers a unique approach to modeling temporal aspects of mental dynamics.