How Does Explanatory Virtue Determine Probability Estimation?-Empirical Discussion on Effect of Instruction

It is important to reveal how humans evaluate an explanation of the recent development of explainable artificial intelligence. So, what makes people feel that one explanation is more likely than another? In the present study, we examine how explanatory virtues affect the process of estimating subjective posterior probability. Through systematically manipulating two virtues, Simplicity-the number of causes used to explain effects-and Scope-the number of effects predicted by causes-in three different conditions, we clarified two points in Experiment 1: (i) that Scope's effect is greater than Simplicity's; and (ii) that these virtues affect the outcome independently. In Experiment 2, we found that instruction about the explanatory structure increased the impact of both virtues' effects but especially that of Simplicity. These results suggest that Scope predominantly affects the estimation of subjective posterior probability, but that, if perspective on the explanatory structure is provided, Simplicity can also affect probability estimation.