A game theory approach for risk analysis and security force deployment against multiple coordinated attacks.

Area of Science:

• Operations Research
• Game Theory
• Security Studies

Background:

• Coordinated terrorist attacks, like the 2015 Paris attacks, necessitate efficient security force allocation.
• Existing allocation methods may not adequately address the complexities of rapid response to multiple simultaneous threats.

Purpose of the Study:

• To develop a novel game-theoretic model for optimizing security force deployment.
• To ensure a fairer and more effective allocation of limited security resources in response to terrorist events.

Main Methods:

• A two-stage game model simulating security force deployment.
• Stage one: Firearms assault game to determine terrorist threat values (TVs) using mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
• Stage two: Shapley values computed from TVs to reallocate security forces for multiple assaults.

Main Results:

• The proposed model provides a fairer division of security forces compared to proportional division.
• Identifies optimal strategies for response agents and attackers in a dynamic threat environment.
• Demonstrates improved resource allocation efficiency for counter-terrorism operations.

Conclusions:

• The game-theoretic approach offers a superior method for allocating security forces during complex terrorist events.
• The model enhances decision-making for security commanders facing multiple, simultaneous threats.
• Fairer resource allocation leads to more effective counter-terrorism responses.