More threatening and more diagnostic: How moral comparisons differ from social comparisons

Area of Science:

• Social Psychology
• Moral Psychology
• Behavioral Economics

Background:

• Social comparison theory posits individuals evaluate themselves by comparing to others.
• Moral self-perception and social standing are significant drivers of human behavior.
• Previous research has not fully explored the unique principles governing moral social comparisons.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate how social comparisons in the moral domain diverge from comparisons in other domains.
• To test alterations to established principles of social comparison theory within the moral context.
• To understand the psychological mechanisms underlying moral social comparison.

Main Methods:

• Employed experience sampling and seven experiments to examine downward comparison tendencies.
• Utilized four additional experiments to investigate the diagnosticity principle in moral comparisons.
• Total of twelve studies involving 5,543 participants were conducted.

Main Results:

• Individuals engage in downward moral comparisons more frequently than in other domains to enhance their moral self-image.
• The threat principle is intensified in the moral domain, leading participants to avoid upward moral comparisons even at personal cost.
• The diagnosticity principle is attenuated, as extreme and dissimilar moral comparisons are considered relevant and threatening.

Conclusions:

• Moral social comparisons operate under distinct principles compared to other social comparisons.
• Morality's central importance intensifies the impact of social comparison threat and reduces the need for diagnosticity.
• These findings highlight the unique nature of moral comparisons in shaping self-perception and social judgment.