Toward a Cultural Evolutionary Psychology: Why the Evolutionary Approach does not Imply Reductionism or Determinism

Does evolutionary psychology (EP) properly account for the sociocultural context? Does it underestimate both the developmental and the relational aspects of the human psyche? Is it instantiated in a mechanistic epistemology? Does it imply determinism or reductionism? The commentaries on our previous target article raised similar questions and we try to tackle them in the current response. Our "epistemological assessment" of Psychology and our consequent unification claim under the banner of the evolutionary approach (Zagaria et al., Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 54(3), 521-562, 2020 ) was deeply examined and discussed. The objections to our target article can be grouped into four main categories. We sum them up and argue why: 1) the pre-paradigmatic status of psychology is a problem rather than a richness of perspectives; 2) EP's criticisms stem from common misconceptions-furthermore, developmental and relational aspects of human psyche might find their natural explanation in EP; 3) EP does not wipe out the emergence of the sociocultural context as something qualitatively different; 4) evolutionary meta-theory is not incompatible with subjectivity. Evolutionary psychology might be approached with caution and curiosity, rather than with prejudicial concepts. Incorporating some legitimate cultural criticisms, it may aspire to become a "cultural evolutionary psychology", hence an integrative psychological meta-theory that tries to connect the biological "plane of existence" (Henriques, Review of General Psychology, 7(2), 150-182, 2003) to the cultural "plane of existence". However, a basic philosophical concern has yet to be answered, i.e. what ultimately constitutes mind and thus the "psycho-logical" science. We argue that when trying to find the answer we know where to look at.