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Laboratory Safety: Handling Burkholderia pseudomallei Isolates without a Biosafety Cabinet
Ian Gassiep1,2, Michelle J Bauer1, Patrick N A Harris1,3
1University of Queensland Centre for Clinical Research, Royal Brisbane and Woman's Hospital, Herston, Queensland, Australia.
Abstract:
Burkholderia pseudomallei is a tier 1 select agent that is associated with laboratory-acquired melioidosis, with international guidelines recommending isolate handling within a class II biosafety cabinet (BSC) in a biosafety level 3 (BSL3) facility. In low-resource settings, this may not be practical; therefore, we aimed to assess the risk of laboratory-acquired melioidosis during routine work. Prior exposure to the organism was determined with a questionnaire and concomitant serology. Of 30 laboratory scientists handling B. pseudomallei on 1,267 occasions outside a biosafety cabinet, no infections were documented and all participants remained seronegative. Additionally, we performed controlled environmental air sampling during 78 laboratory handling events, including plate opening, oxidase testing, and McFarland suspension creation. None of the experiments demonstrated aerosolization of the organism. This study suggests the risk of laboratory-acquired melioidosis is low. However, individual laboratories will need to undertake a risk assessment, including melioidosis endemicity, availability of resources for containment, the nature of routine handling to be undertaken, and the presence of predisposing risk factors for infection in the staff concerned. Additionally, laboratories should take region-specific guidelines into consideration. Further research is required to better inform on the overall risk of infection in the microbiology laboratory.
Insights
Handling Burkholderia pseudomallei outside a biosafety cabinet poses a low risk for laboratory-acquired melioidosis. This study found no infections or seroconversions among scientists performing routine tasks without enhanced containment.
Area of Science:
- Microbiology
- Infectious Diseases
- Occupational Safety
Background:
- Burkholderia pseudomallei causes melioidosis, a serious infection.
- International guidelines mandate high-level biosafety containment (BSL3) for handling this select agent.
- Low-resource settings face challenges in adhering to strict containment protocols.
Purpose of the Study:
- To assess the actual risk of laboratory-acquired melioidosis during routine B. pseudomallei handling.
- To evaluate safety measures for scientists working with this pathogen in non-ideal conditions.
Main Methods:
- Surveyed 30 laboratory scientists on prior exposure and performed serology.
- Monitored 1,267 handling events of B. pseudomallei outside a biosafety cabinet.
- Conducted environmental air sampling during 78 specific laboratory procedures.
Main Results:
- No laboratory-acquired infections or seroconversions were documented in the study group.
- Environmental air sampling did not detect B. pseudomallei aerosolization during handling.
- The study suggests a low risk of infection under the assessed conditions.
Conclusions:
- Routine laboratory work with B. pseudomallei outside a biosafety cabinet appears to carry a low risk.
- Laboratories must conduct individualized risk assessments considering endemicity, resources, and staff factors.
- Further research is needed to fully understand infection risks in microbiology laboratories.
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