Movements, embodiment and the emergence of decisions. Insights from insect navigation

We readily infer that animals make decisions, but what this implies is usually not clearly defined. The notion of 'decision-making' ultimately stems from human introspection, and is thus loaded with anthropomorphic assumptions. Notably, the decision is made internally, is based on information, and precedes the goal directed behaviour. Also, making a decision implies that 'something' did it, thus hints at the presence of a cognitive mind, whose existence is independent of the decision itself. This view may convey some truth, but here I take the opposite stance. Using examples from research in insect navigation, this essay highlights how apparent decisions can emerge without a brain, how actions can precede information or how sophisticated goal directed behaviours can be implemented without neural decisions. This perspective requires us to shake off the idea that behaviour is a consequence of the brain; and embrace the concept that movements arise from - as much as participate in - distributed interactions between various computational centres - including the body - that reverberate in closed-loop with the environment. From this perspective we may start to picture how a cognitive mind can be the consequence, rather than the cause, of such neural and body movements.